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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMADOR AREVALO, • , 
Plaintiff- ] 
Appellant, 
v. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant-
Respondent. ; 
Case No. 870014-CA 
Category No. 6 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was plaintiff denied his right to due 
process under the Utah and United States Constitutions by 
defendant's failure to provide him with actual notice of his 
right to appeal? 
2. Was the defendant's decision that plaintiff 
failed to establish good cause for filing a late appeal 
supported by substantial evidence? 
3- Did the defendant err in refusing to hear 
plaintiff's case under its continuing jurisdiction authori-
ty? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, dated December 
23, 1986 (R 17), affirming a decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ). Plaintiff filed his request for a hearing 
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on August 11, 1986 (R 75-76), for the purpose of contesting 
a March 11, 1983 decision by the Department of Employment 
Security that he had knowingly withheld material information 
concerning his eligibility for unemployment compensation 
benefits (UCB). (R 78) The 1983 decision resulted in the 
amount of $6,664 being claimed due and payable (R 78). 
Plaintiff's hearing was held on October 28, 1986 where he 
was represented by Paralegal Tracy Burgess of Utah Legal 
Services, and by the undersigned attorney. (R 44) 
Following the receipt of exhibits at the hearing 
and the taking of testimony, ALJ Barnes ruled on November 3, 
1986 that plaintiff's appeal was not timely within the 
requirements of U.C.A. § 3 5-4-6(c) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act (R 42-43). The ALJ concluded, therefore, that 
he lacked jurisdiction for further consideration of the 
matter. (R 43) Plaintiff made a timely request for review 
of the hearing decision on November 5, 1986. (R 41) 
Plaintiff's request for review was denied and he filed a 
timely petition for a Writ of Review with this court on 
January 13, 1987. (R 6-7) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a thirty-four-year-old individual who 
resides with his wife and three children in Layton, Utah. 
(R 46) In 1982, plaintiff was employed in the state of Utah 
and, following termination from his employinent, applied for 
and received unemployment compensation benefits. (R 78) 
Plaintiff, who is illiterate in the English language (R 39, 
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46, 66), was advised by defendant on February 9, 1983 of a 
possible overpayment. (R 78) Plaintiff did not respond to 
the inquiry since he had left the United States and returned 
to Mexico. (R 78) He resided in Mexico until approximately 
June, 1984 when he returned to this country and married his 
current wife, who is a United States citizen. (R 56) On the 
basis of his marriage to a U.S. citizen, plaintiff was 
granted permanent residence status by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). (R 38) I 
According to records maintained by defendant, a 
Notice of Denial of Benefits was mailed to plaintiff on 
March 11, 1983 advising him that he had knowingly withheld 
material information to receive benefits. Plaintiff was 
advised in the Notice of his right to a hearing; because of 
his absence from the country, he never received the notice 
and consequently did not request a hearing. Thus, the 
March 11, 1983 Notice became a final determination finding 
that plaintiff had incurred a fraud overpayment in the 
amount of $6,664. | 
Following his marriage, plaintiff again was 
employed in the state of Utah. Sometime during November, 
1985, he became separated from employment and applied for 
UCB at the Clearfield Job Service office. Testimony at his 
hearing showed that plaintiff was initially determined 
eligible for benefits by a Job Service caseworker and was 
advised that he would begin receiving weekly benefits. The 
caseworker then consulted with Doug Larson, a claims 
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examiner in the Job Service office, who discovered the 
outstanding 1983 overpayment. Plaintiff was then advised 
that he was ineligible to receive benefits and would have to 
begin repaying the overpaid amount. (R 56-58)" 
Uncontradicted testimony by plaintiff and his wife 
at the hearing established that plaintiff was never provided 
with an actual copy of the March, 1983 decision nor was he 
specifically advised of a time deadline for filing a request 
for a hearing. (R 56-58) Moreover, the testimony showed 
that the only advice given plaintiff by the Job Service 
office was that he had to pay the claim. (R 56) Plaintiff 
was unfamiliar with his hearing rights and was afraid that 
he would be arrested if he did not pay the outstanding 
amount. (R 58) No written notice was given to plaintiff 
advising him of any further right to review of the 1983 
decision. 
In March, 1986, acting upon the advice of a fellow 
employee, plaintiff contacted the Ogden office of Utah Legal 
Services for legal advice. (R 51) His case was accepted by 
Paralegal Tracy Burgess on March 17, 1986, who began inves-
tigating the possible merits of an appeal. (R 62) Ms. 
Burgess' testimony showed that she was not aware at that 
time of a specific deadline for requesting a hearing and had 
handled only one unemployment case prior to that time. 
(R 64-65) Following lengthy review of his case by Ms. 
Burgess, a request for hearing was filed on August 11, 1986. 
(R 75) 
0 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT! 
The ALJ's refusal to consider the merits of 
plaintiff's case represents a denial of plaintiff's right to 
procedural due process. Plaintiff has several property 
interests at stake, including his right to receive future 
wages without being subject to garnishment or other collec-
tion procedures as well as a right to ongoing unemployment 
compensation benefits, when eligible. The state's refusal 
to grant plaintiff a hearing on the merits of his case, its 
failure to give him actual notice of the fraud overpayment 
decision and its improper advice as to his appeal rights 
constitute a deprivation of his right to due process. 
The defendant further erred in applying its own 
regulations, since substantial evidence shows that plaintiff 
never actually received a copy of the decision until the day 
of his hearing. Further, all of the circumstances in 
plaintiff's case show that he did not have control over the 
timely filing of his appeal. Finally, the state should have 
liberally construed the statute in question and taken 
jurisdiction of plaintiff's case under its continuing 
jurisdiction authority. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
SINCE ITS REFUSAL TO GRANT PLAINTIFF A HEARING 
DENIED HIM HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
It is a fundamental principle of law that a state 
may not deprive a person of a constitutionally protected 
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liberty or property interest without observing the require-
ments of due process of law. It is without question in this 
case that state action was involved, since the Department of 
Employment Security initiated the procedure which resulted 
in the March 11, 1983 fraud overpayment. State action was 
also involved in November, 1985 when plaintiff was denied 
further unemployment compensation benefits by representa-
tives of the Clearfield Job Service office because of the 
outstanding fraud overpayment. It is this action, and the 
inaction of the Clearfield Job Service caseworker and claims 
examiner, all of whom are employees of the state of Utah, 
that deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. 
A constitutionally protected property interest is 
present in plaintiff's case. The state's action in estab-
lishing a fraud overpayment subjects plaintiff to ongoing 
financial liability for repayment of a $6,664.00 claim. Any 
future wages which plaintiff earns, and in which he has a 
property interest, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 
U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349(1969), will be 
subject to ongoing collection procedures. Additionally, 
under applicable Utah law, plaintiff remains disqualified 
from receiving future UCB until he has repaid the fraud 
overpayment. Thus, plaintiff's entitlement to unemployment 
compensation has been and will be denied unless he is 
permitted to address the allegation that he willfully 
withheld material information resulting in an overpayment. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, like many other appellate 
courts, has concluded that a person's right to UCB is a 
constitutionally protected property interest. In Gray v. 
Department of Employment Security, 681 P.2d 807, 817 (Ut. 
1984) the Court noted that although the United States 
Supreme Court had never held explicitly that UCB fell within 
the definition of a property interest, such benefits were 
implicitly encompassed therein. See Steinberg v. Fusari, 
419 US 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 539, 42 L.Ed.2d 521, .reh'g 
denied, 420 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 1340, 43 L.Ed.2d 433 (1975). 
The Court cited with approval the decision in Klimko v. 
Virginia Employment Commission, 216 Va. 750, 222 S.E.2d 559 
(1976) wherein the Virginia Court held that unemployment 
compensation benefits "may constitute a property interest 
within the protection of the procedural due process guaran-
tees of the Constitution." Id.-, at 565. 
Other cases which support the Utah Court's holding 
include Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F.Supp. 40, 47 (E.D. Mo. 
1977) which held, in reliance on Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 571-72, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 
(1972) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 
1011, 1017, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), that unemployment bene-
fits, like welfare benefits, are a matter of statutory 
entitlement and, therefore, are interests which are protect-
ed by the procedural due process requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The court noted a long list of items 
found to be property interests including wages and a 
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person's good name and reputation. Id., at 47, n. 1 Simi-
larly, in Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320, 1327 
(D.C.Va. 1985), the federal court followed the Virginia 
Supreme Court's lead in Klimko, supra, and assumed that a 
property interest existed in unemployment compensation 
benefits. 
Once it is established that state action is 
involved affecting a property interest, the inquiry must 
next focus on what process is due. A good starting point 
for such an inquiry is the decision in Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780 (1971) 
wherein the Court, in the light of one hundred years of 
decisions addressing due process issues, identified two 
important principles firmly imbedded in the Court's due 
process jurisprudence. The Court noted: 
Prior cases establish, first, that due process re-
quires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing 
state interest of overriding significance, persons 
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through 
the judicial process must be given a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard. Id., at 377. 
The Court stressed that the Constitution requires 
a "meaningful opportunity" to be heard. It further ob-
served: 
That the hearing required by due process is subject to 
waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its 
root requirement that an individual be given an oppor-
tunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any 
significant property interest, except for extraordinary 
situations where some valid governmental interest is at 
stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after 
the event. (Emphasis in the original) Id.., at 378-79 
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The second important due process principle identi-
fied by the Court is that a statute or rule may be constitu-
tionally defective as applied. The Court summarized: 
Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule 
may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it 
operates to deprive an individual of a protected right 
although its general validity as a measure enacted in 
the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond 
question. Id.., at 379 
Decisions by the Utah Supreme Court, and courts in 
other jurisdictions, underscore the fundamental relevance of 
the points identified by the United States Supreme Court. 
The Utah court has described timely and adequate notice and 
the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way as "the very 
heart of procedural fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207, 1211 (Ut. 1983) The Court reviewed several decisions 
in sister states which further support the principle that 
the central requisite of procedural due process is that a 
hearing be prefaced by timely notice which adequately 
informs the parties of the specific issues.
 <Id., at 1213. 
See also Pease v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 694 P.2d 
613 (Ut. 1984) (workers compensation applicant entitled to 
notice of pendency of an action). 
The Utah Court, in Nelson v. Jacobsen, supra, also 
reflected the United States Supreme Court's holding that due 
process is a flexible concept. The Court observed: 
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be 
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstances. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
supra, at 1213 
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The Court cited with approval the holding in Rupp 
v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Ut.1980) which 
opined: 
[T]he demands of due process rest on the concept of 
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties in-
volved. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Hagopian v. 
Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1972) has well summa-
rized the flexibility required in applying the due process 
principle: 
In approaching the question of what process is due 
before governmental action adversely affecting private 
interests may properly be taken, it must be recognized 
that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule 
of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set 
of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept 
which depends upon the balancing of various factors, 
including the nature of the private right or interest 
that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding 
is adversarial in character, the severity and conse-
quences of any action that might be taken.... 
The Utah Supreme Court has used similar language 
in characterizing due process: 
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it 
is flexible and requires such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands. In an analysis of a 
procedure an important factor is the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of a private interest through the 
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards. Worrall v. 
Qgden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut. 
1980) 
The actions of the state of Utah violated plain-
tiff 's fundamental right to due process as that concept is 
understood and applied in American jurisprudence. When all 
of the relevant facts are considered, it cannot be said that 
plaintiff was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
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At the time the state of Utah made its initial determination 
on March 11, 1983 that plaintiff had incurred an overpayment 
based on willful withholding of material information, 
plaintiff was not present in this country- There is no 
evidence in the record to indicate that plaintiff ever 
received the state's notice of determination of a fraud 
overpayment. In fact, plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony 
shows that he had not seen the Notice of Denial of Benefits 
until his hearing on October 28, 1986. Since he did not 
receive the March 11, 1983 decision, plaintiff was 
effectively denied personal notice of the time limitations 
for requesting further review. 
In view of the significant property interest 
involved, it would be unjustified to argue that the state's 
mere mailing of the March 11, 1983 Notice satisfied the 
requirements of procedural due process. The Ohio federal 
court in Bennett v. Lopman, 598 F.Supp. 774 (N.D. Oh. 1984) 
has addressed the question of what the consequences should 
be when an unemployment compensation benefits claimant 
receives no notice whatsoever. The court held that the Ohio 
statute, which did not provide a good faith exception to a 
thirty day filing deadline for non-receipt of an administra-
tive decision, violated due process. The court observed 
that a statute which ends a claimant's appeal rights thirty 
days after mailing of notice can only satisfy due process 
standards if there is a conclusive presumption that mailing 
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of the decision results in its receipt by the claimant. 
Id., at 783. The court further observed: 
It is established that in most instances the U.S. mails 
can be "reasonably calculated" to notify an individual. 
However, there are inevitably going to be instances 
when notice is not received, through no fault of either 
the party posting the item or the party to whom the 
item is addressed. At one time or another, both the 
Government [sic] and members of the public will become 
victims of the vagaries of this country's postal system 
( which has been the subject of anecdotes about letters 
being lost and finally arriving albeit years late.) 
The government would be draconian to deny an individual 
a property right in unemployment benefits, see Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 
(1970), without any consideration for the arbitrariness 
of the non-receipt of that notice. This presumption of 
receipt upon mailing is at best highly formalistic and 
at worst totally unrealistic. Admittedly, in the case 
of recipients of unemployment benefits, it may be 
difficult for a state agency to determine the actual 
current address for the party because of changes in 
residence, etc., conditioned by the loss of income. 
Nonetheless, a claimant has a right to personal notice. 
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 727, 24 
L.Ed. 565 (1877). Id., at 783. 
In this case, it is beyond dispute that plaintiff 
never received personal notice until the day of the hearing 
of the state's decision determining that he had fraudulently 
incurred an overpayment. The state's following of its usual 
procedure of mailing the notice of decision to the claim-
ant's last known address did not accomplish the purpose of 
advising plaintiff that his property interests were in 
jeopardy. Although the state's policy of mailing notice by 
regular means may be sufficient in most cases, it is clear 
that it was insufficient in this case to provide plaintiff 
with personal notice. For that reason alone it should be 
concluded that plaintiff was denied his constitutional right 
to due process. 
13 
Plaintiff's due process rights were further 
affected when he appeared at the Clearfield Job Service 
office in November, 1985• At that time, after being ini-
tially advised that he was eligible for current unemployment 
compensation benefits, plaintiff was for the first time 
advised of the outstanding fraud overpayment. However, 
instead of being personally served with the March 11, 1983 
Notice of Denial of Benefits wherein his appeal rights were 
contained, the only advice given by the state employees 
involved was that plaintiff was required to repay the 
overpayment. Although the state's unemployment compensation 
rules provide that within ten days after learning of an 
adverse decision, a claimant may request a timely hearing, 
there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever 
received either actual or even constructive notice of his 
right to further review. Given plaintiff's educational and 
cultural limitations, it is understandable that he was 
incapable of making further inquiry as to his legal rights. 
In view of all the circumstances, to leave stand-
ing the Board of Review's decision would result in an 
unprecedented and unacceptably inflexible application of due 
process. Although the state's rules which permit the late 
filing of a hearing request might be sufficient under the 
most favorable circumstances to safeguard an affected 
person's right to procedural due process, it is clear that 
they were markedly insufficient in this case. It may 
properly be concluded that whatever interest the state has 
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in the efficiency of its hearing system is outweighed by the 
plaintiff's right to protect himself against an unfair 
deprivation of his property interest. The cost to the 
state of giving personal notice to a person in plaintiff's 
circumstances is not great. Had plaintiff been properly 
advised in writing on the day he appeared at the Clearfield 
Job Service office, it is far more likely that he would have 
taken timely action to assert his appeal rights. Only a 
highly technical application of the due process right could 
justify the state's action in this case. 
The need for proper application of due process is 
especially great in this case, since the applicable Utah 
statute allows the state to impose the most severe penalty 
for the willful withholding of material information. U.C.A. 
§ 35-4-5(e) The statute in question distinguishes between 
overpayments based simply on fault and those arising from 
fraud. A fault overpayment must be repaid, but, in the 
discretion of the Industrial Commission, the overpaid sum 
may be deducted from any future benefits payable to the 
claimant. U.C.A. § 35-4-6(d) In contrast, overpayments 
arising from fraud are doubled as a penalty and are collect-
ible by civil action or warrant. U.C.A. § 35-4-5(e) The 
fraud overpayment may not be set off against future amounts 
payable. In addition, the statute provides that a claimant 
against whom a fraud overpayment has been assessed is 
ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit if the 
amount owed remains unpaid. 
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The requirement of legal notice to those affected 
has always been a prerequisite to lawful punitive action. 
Wright v. Arkansas Activities Association, 501 F.2d 25, (8th 
Cir. 1974) Further, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated: 
The "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer 
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not 
involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal convic-
tion, is a principle basic to our society." Joint 
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US 123, 168, 95 
L.Ed. 817, 71 S.Ct 624 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333, 47 
L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976). 
Sanctions are not to be assessed lightly or 
without fair notice and there must be sufficient opportunity 
for the party subject to the sanction to demonstrate that 
his conduct was not undertaken recklessly or willfully. 
F.T.C. v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., 799 F.2d 507, 510 (9th 
Cir. 1986) 
The penalty which the state seeks to impose on the 
plaintiff in the form of a fraud overpayment is highly 
punitive in nature. If the need for constitutional protec-
tions can be measured in terms of the seriousness of the 
potential harm, then plaintiff has the highest need for due 
process protection. Plaintiff stands to suffer a grievous 
loss unless the court acts to assure his constitutional 
right to be heard. 
Inherent in the concept of due process is the 
American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all. Howard 
v. United States, 372 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1967) If 
fundamental fairness is the test of due process, Watson v. 
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Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1966), then it must 
be concluded that the state has failed in this case. The 
denial of a hearing to a low income, illiterate claimant who 
was never been given actual notice of his hearing rights and 
who faces the most severe penalty available under the 
Employment Security Act patently offends the American ideal 
of fairness. That ideal can only have real meaning if the 
most vulnerable individuals, such as the plaintiff herein, 
are accorded the due process required by the Utah and United 
States Constitutions. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW SHOULD 
BE REVERSED SINCE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
IS LACKING FOR ITS DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF 
LACKED GOOD CAUSE TO MAKE A LATE APPEAL. 
The ALJ in his Reasoning and Conclusions of Law 
applied U.C.A. § 35-4-6(c) which provides: 
f,The claimant or any other party entitled to 
notice of a determination as herein provided may 
file an appeal from such determination with an 
appeal referee within ten days after the date of 
mailing of the notice to his last known address 
or, if such notice is not mailed, within ten days 
after the date of delivery of such notice.(R 43) 
The ALJ then considered the rules adopted by the 
Department of Employment Security for determining good cause 
for a late appeal. (Appendix A) The grounds for establish-
ing good cause are stated in the disjunctive and provide, in 
part: 
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is 
determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause. 
Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is 
shown that: 
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1. The appeal was filed within ten days of actual 
receipt of the decision if such receipt was beyond 
the original appeal period and not the result of 
willful neglect; Department of Employment Securi-
ty Rules § A71-07-l:6 H. 
The ALJ erred, first of all, since the claimant's 
uncontradicted testimony showed that he had not received an 
actual copy of the March 11, 1983 decision until the date of 
the hearing on October 28, 1986. (R 49) Although the 
testimony showed that plaintiff was orally advised by 
Clearfield Job Service workers in November, 1985 of the 
outstanding fraud overpayment, there is no evidence that he 
was personally served with a copy of the decision at that 
time. On this ground alone, the ALJ should have granted 
plaintiff's late appeal. 
The remaining two grounds for filing a late appeal 
are equally applicable in plaintiff's case. They provide: 
2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to circum-
stances beyond the control of the appellant; or 
3. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for 
circumstances which were compelling and reasonable. 
Department of Employment Security Rules § A71-07-l:6 H 
The facts established show that plaintiff's case 
meets these criteria. Plaintiff cannot be said to have had 
control of his decision to file an appeal when in November, 
1985 he was not given an actual copy of the decision, was 
not advised of his appeal rights by Clearfield Job Service 
workers and, in fact, was told that all he could do was pay 
off the judgment. Given plaintiff's unfamiliarity with the 
unemployment compensation system, it is not unreasonable 
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that he did not take any action until a co-worker advised 
him in March, 1986 to contact Utah Legal Services. Although 
the actual filing of the request for a hearing was further 
delayed by his paralegal representative, the plaintiff again 
had no control over his representativefs handling of the 
case. His representative's delay in requesting a hearing, 
for whatever reason, should have no effect on the establish-
ment of good cause. Trujillo v. Industrial Commission, 648 
P.2d 1094, 1096 (Colo.App. 1982) When the facts of plain-
tiff's case are viewed in their entirety, it may properly be 
concluded that his delay was due to circumstances beyond his 
control or for circumstances which were compelling and 
reasonable. For this further reason, the Board of Review's 
decision should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION SHOULD BE 
REVERSED SINCE IT FAILED TO TAKE JURIS-
DICTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE UNDER ITS 
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION AUTHORITY. 
The Utah Code provides that defendant has unlimit-
ed jurisdiction over fraud determinations. U.C.A. § 
35-4-6(b) That section provides, in part: 
Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous. Upon 
its own initiative or upon application of any party 
affected, the commission or its authorized representa-
tives may on the basis of change in conditions or 
because of a mistake as to facts, review a decision 
allowing or disallowing in whole or in part a claim for 
benefits.... 
No review shall be made after one year from the date of 
the original determination except in cases of fraud, or 
claimant fault, as provided in subsection (d) of this 
section. 
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The rule adopted by the Department of Employment 
Security implementing this section of the Code provides: 
There is no time limitation on exercising jurisdiction 
if there was fraud or a [sic] overpayment as the result 
of fault by the claimant. There must be an overpayment 
which is charged to the claimant in accordance with 
provisions of Section 35-4-6(d) before jurisdiction can 
be taken beyond one year after the original determina-
tion. Department of Employment Security Rules § 
A71-07-l:6 (II)C (Appendix B) 
The aforecited authority was a sufficient basis 
for the state of Utah to have taken jurisdiction in plain-
tiff's case. In view of the circumstances discussed limit-
ing plaintiff's ability to exercise his appeal rights, 
including the denial of due process, the state erred in 
failing to exercise jurisdiction. Case law has established 
that unemployment compensation statutes are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the claimant when possible. Superior 
Cablevision Installers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 6 83 
P.2d 444 (Ut. 1984); Trujillo v. Industrial Commission, 
supra, at 1096. Application.of that principle in this case 
should have been sufficient for the ALJ to permit plaintiff 
to address the merits of the issues raised in his case. 
CONCLUSION 
The ALJ's refusal to consider the merits of 
plaintiff's case represents a denial of plaintiff's right to 
procedural due process. Plaintiff has several property 
interests at stake, including his right to receive future 
wages without being subject to garnishment^or other collec-
tion procedures as well as a right to ongoing unemployment 
compensation benefits, when eligible. The state's refusal 
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to grant plaintiff a hearing on the merits of his case, its 
failure to give him actual notice of the fraud overpayment 
decision and its improper advice as to his appeal rights 
constitute a deprivation of his right to due process. 
The defendant further erred in applying its own 
regulations, since substantial evidence shows that plaintiff 
never actually received a copy of the decision until the day 
of his hearing. Further, all of the circumstances in 
plaintiff's case show that he did not have control over the 
timely filing of his appeal. Finally, the state should have 
liberally construed the statute in question and taken 
jurisdiction of plaintiff's case under its continuing 
jurisdiction authority. For all these reasons, the decision 
of the Board of Review should be reversed and plaintiff 
permitted to address the merits of his case. 
DATED this *D<5^ day of /UyJir , 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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A71-07-l:6 DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY — RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(III) PROVISIONS FOR FILING AN APPEAL 
Section 35-4-6(c) The claimant or any other party entitled 
to notice of a determination as herein provided may file an 
appeal from such determination with an appeal referee with-
in ten days after the date of mailing of the notice to his 
last known address or, if such notice is not mailed, with-
in ten days days after the date of delivery of such notice. 
APPEAL NOTICE 
Unless the appeal or referral is withdrawn with his permis-
sion, the appeal referee, after affording the parties 
reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, shall make find-
ings and conclusions on the basis thereof affirm, modify, 
or reverse such determination; provided, the referee shall 
give notice of the pendence of an appeal to the commission, 
which may thenceforth be a party to the proceedings. 
COPY OF DECISION 
The parties shall be promptly notified of such referee's 
decision and shall be furnished with a copy of the decision 
and the findings and conclusions in support thereof and 
such decision shall be deemed to be final unless, within 
ten days after the date of mailing of notice thereof to the 
party's last known addres, or in the absence of such mail-
ings, within ten days after the delivery of such notice, 
further appeal is initiated pursuant to the provisions of 
section 35-4-10. 
A. GENERAL DEFINITION 
This provision of the act provides the opportunity for any parties affected by 
decisions made by the Department to file an appeal. The time limitations for 
filing appeals, which includes protests, requests for hearings, petitions and 
other requests or applications, and the exceptions to those time limitations are 
explained herein. This section also provides provisions for withdrawing appeals, 
explains the opportunities which must be provided to parties to assure a fair 
hearing; identifies the commission as a party to the hearing; specifies the 
requirements of notification of the referee's decision; and explains the further 
rights of appeal. 
VB. "ISSUANCE OF DETERMINATIONS 
A notice of determination is not considered to have been issued unless it is 
sent through the U.S. mail or served in person. 
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C. APPEAL TIME LIMITATION FOR DECISIONS THAT ARE NOT MAILED 
If a decision issued by the Department is personally given to a party rather than 
sent through the mail, the amount of time permitted for an appeal is ten calendar 
days unless otherwise specified on the decision or by the Act. 
D. APPEAL TIME LIMITATION FOR DECISIONS WHICH ARE MAILED 
If a decision issued by the Department is mailed, three days are added to the 
time prescribed by the Act for filing the appeal. Therefore, the amount of time 
permitted for filing an appeal from any decision that is mailed by the Department 
is thirteen calendar days unless otherwise specified on the decision or by the 
Act. 
E." COMPUTATION OF TIME LIMITATIONS 
In computing the period of time allowed by the Act for filing appeals under 
this section, the day the decision is mailed or handed to a party is not to be 
included. The last day of the appeal period that follows is to be included in 
the computation unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday when the offices 
of the Department are closed. If the last day permitted for filing an appeal 
falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the time permitted for filing a 
timely appeal will be extended to the next day when the offices of the Department 
are open. 
F. DATE OF RECEIPT 
Any appeal which has been sent through the U.S. mail is considered filed and 
received by the Department on the date shown by the post office cancellation 
mark. When the post mark date cannot be established because it is illegible, 
erroneous or omitted, the appeal will be considered filed on the date it was 
mailed if the sender establishes that date by competent evidence and can show 
that it was mailed prior to the date of actual receipt. If the date of mailing 
cannot be established by competent evidence, the document will be considered 
filed on the date it is actually received by the Department as shown by the 
Department's date stamp on the document or other credible evidence such as a 
written notation of the date of receipt. 
G. LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION 
When i t appears that an appeal may not have been f i l e d wi th in the time allowed 
by the Act or these Rules, the appellant w i l l be no t i f i ed and given an opportunity 
to show that the appeal was timely or was delayed for good cause. I f i t is found 
that the appeal was riot f i l e d within the applicable time l i m i t and the delay was 
without good cause, the Administrative Law Judge w i l l not have j u r i sd i c t i on to 
consider the merits unless j u r i sd i c t i on is established in accordance with 
provisions of Section 35-4-6(b) of the Act. Any decision wi th regard to j u r i s d i c -
t ional issues w i l l be issued in wr i t ing and given or mailed to a l l interested 
part ies with a clear statement of the r igh t of fur ther appeal or j ud ic ia l review. 
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H. GOOD CAUSE FOR NOT FILING WITHIN TIME LIMITATIONS 
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is determined that the appeal 
was delayed for good cause• Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is 
shown that: 
1. The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual receipt of the decision if 
such receipt was beyond the original appeal period and not the result of willful 
neglect; or 
2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the control 
of the appellant; or 
3. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which were 
compelling and reasonable. 
I. PROCEDURE FOR FILING AN APPEAL 
An appeal must be filed in writing by mailing a signed letter to the mailing 
address of the Appeals Tribunal as shown on the notice of decision, or submitting 
a written statement at a Job Service office in Utah or in the state in which the 
appellant resides. The appeal must be signed by an interested party who has a 
right to notice of a determination unless it can be shown that the interested 
party has conveyed in writing the authority to another person to act in his 
behalf, or he is physically or mentally incapable of acting in his own behalf. 
The statement of appeal should give the date and issue of the decision being 
appealed, the social security number of any claimant involved, the employer number 
or case number of the decision, a statement of the intent of the appeal and the 
facts or reasons which support the request. However, the failure of an appellant 
to include such information will not preclude the acceptance of an appeal. The 
scope of review will not be limited to the issues or contentions stated in the 
appeal. If the Department has begun payment of benefits to a claimant, such 
payments will not be discontinued pending the outcome of an appeal even if the 
claimant is willing to waive his right to payment. However, if benefits are 
denied as a result of the appeal an overpayment may be established in accordance 
with provisions of either Section 35-4-6(d) or 35-4~6(e) of the Act. 
J. REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HEARING 
1. Notice 
a. All interested parties will be notified by mail at least seven days 
prior to the hearing pf: 
(1) The time and place, or conditions of the hearing, 
(2) The legal issues, 
(3) The consequences of not appearing, and 
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(4) The procedures and limitations for requesting rescheduling. 
b. When a new issue arises during the hearing or under other unusual 
circumstances, advance written notice may be waived by the parties after a full 
verbal explanation of the issues and potential results. 
c. It is the responsibility of the parties to a hearing to notify any 
representatives or witnesses of the time and place of the hearing and to make 
necessary arrangements for their participation. 
d. If a party has designated a person or professional organization as 
his agent, notice of hearings will be sent to that agent and when such notice is 
sent, it will be considered that the party has been given notice. 
e. If an interpreter is needed by any parties or their witnesses, the 
party should arrange for an interpreter who is an adult with fluent ability to 
understand and speak english and the language of the person testifying, or notify 
the Appeals Office at the time the appeal is filed, (or when notification is 
given that an appeal has been filed), that assistance is required in arranging 
for an interpreter. 
2. Hearing of Appeal 
a. All hearings will be conducted informally and in such manner as to 
protect the rights of the parties. All issues relevant to the appeal will be 
considered and passed upon. The decision of the Appeals Referee, hereafter 
referred to as Administrative Law Judge, will be based solely on the testimony 
and evidence presented at the hearing. 
b. All testimony of witnesses will be given under oath. Any party to an 
appeal will be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and present any pertinent 
evidence of probative value and to know and rebut by cross-examination or otherwise 
any other evidence submitted. The Administrative Law Judge will direct the order 
of testimony and rule on the admissibility of evidence. Oral or written evidence 
of any nature, whether or not conforming to the legal rules of evidence, may be 
accepted and will be given its proper weight. However, no finding of fact will 
be based solely on contested hearsay. Any official records of the Department, 
including reports submitted in connection with the administration of the Employ-
ment Security Act may be included in the record. The Administrative Law Judge 
may take such additional evidence as is deemed necessary. 
c. The parties to an appeal, with consent of the Administrative Law 
Judge, may stipulate to the facts involved. The Administrative Law Judge may 
decide the appeal on the basis of such facts, or in his discretion, may set 
the appeal for hearing and take such further evidence as deemed necessary to 
determine the appeal. 
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d. The Administrative Law Judge may require portions of the evidence to 
be transcribed as necessary for rendering a decision. 
K. RESCHEDULING AND ADJOURNMENT OF HEARINGS 
1 . The Administrative Law Judge may, at his d isc re t ion , adjourn or continue 
a hearing on his own motion. 
2. Prior to the Hearing 
A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge may be rescheduled or postponed for 
reasonable cause if the request is made to the Administrative Law Judge orally 
or in writing before the hearing is concluded. Such a request may be made by 
any interested party, however, more than one continuance will not normally be 
granted if it adversely impacts on the other parties rights to benefits or poten-
tial liability for benefit costs. Reasonable cause may not be established solely 
because of such things as: 
a. Conflicting personal or business plans or appointments of the 
parties or their witnesses that could reasonably be rearranged, 
b. Failure to make timely arrangements for witnesses or to request 
subpoenaes of witnesses, 
c. Failure to arrange for legal counsel in sufficient time to prepare 
for the hearing, 
d. Failure to obtain pertinent documents which could reasonably have 
been obtained prior to the hearing, 
e. Lack of preparation. 
3. If one of the parties fails to appear at the hearing, the Administrative 
Law Judge will, unless there is good cause for continuance, issue a decision 
based on the available evidence. 
4. After the Hearing 
Any party who fails to participate personally or by authorized representative at 
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge may, within seven days after the 
scheduled date of the hearing, make a written request for reopening of the hearing. 
Such petition will be granted if good cause is shown for failing to participate. 
A request for reopening made after the scheduled hearing must be in writing; it 
must state the reason(s) believed to constitute good cause for failing to partici-
pate at the hearing; and it must be delivered or mailed within a seven day period 
to the Appeals office or to an office of the Department of Employment Security or 
to a Job Service office in any state.1 If the request for reopening is not filed 
within seven days, reopening will not1 be granted unless the party can show good 
cause for failing to make the request within the seven day time limitation. If 
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a request for reopening is not allowed, a copy of the decision will be given or 
mailed to each party, with a clear statement of the right of appeal or judicial 
review. If a request for reopening is made, a hearing will be scheduled and 
notice will be given or mailed to each party to the appeal, to determine if there 
is good cause for reopening the hearing. 
a. Failure to report as instructed at the time and place of the scheduled 
hearing is the equalivant of failing to participate even if the party reports at 
another time or place. In such circumstances, the party must make a written 
request for rescheduling and show good cause in accordance with these Rules 
before the matter will be rescheduled. 
b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal hearing may not 
include such things as: 
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the notice of hearing, 
(2) Failure to arrange personal circumstances such as transportation 
or childcare, 
(3) Failure to arrange for receipt or distribution of mail, 
(4) Failure to deligate responsibility for participation in the 
hearing, 
(5) Forgetfulness. 
c. In the event that an appeal has been taken or an application for 
review has been made to the Board of Review before the request for reopening is 
filed, such request will be referred to the Board of Review. 
L. WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAL 
Any party who has filed an appeal from a decision of the Department may request 
withdrawal of the appeal by making a request to an Administrative Law Judge, 
explaining the reasons for the withdrawal. The Administrative Law Judge may 
deny such a request if the withdrawal of the appeal could result in a disservice 
to any of the parties, including the Commission. 
M. COMMISSION A PARTY TO PROCEEDINGS 
The Department is the authorized agent of the commission. The Act requires that 
the commission be given notice of the pendancy of an appeal and that the commis-
sion will be a party to the proceedings. Unless the Department designates a 
representative who is authorized to represent the Department in appeals, notifica-
tion of appeals will be sent to the local office which rendered the initial 
determination. As a party to the hearing the Department or its representatives 
have all the rights and responsibilities of other interested parties to present 
evidence, bring witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, give rebuttal evidence, and 
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appeal decisions of the Administrative Law Judge. Where the burden of proof is 
with the Department, the failure of the Department to meet that burden may result 
in an unfavorable ruling for the Department. The Administrative Law Judge cannot 
act as the agent for the Department, and therefore is limited to including in 
the record only that evidence which is in the Deparment files or submitted by 
Department representatives. Witnesses for the Department may be called on 
the motion of the Administrative Law Judge when the need for such testimony is 
necessary to clarify rather than impeach the testimony or evidence presented by 
the other parties, or the need for such witnesses or evidence could not have 
been anticipated by the Department prior to the hearing. 
N. PROMPT NOTIFICATION OF DECISION 
All decisions by Administrative Law Judges which effect the rights of any party 
with regard to benefits, tax liability, or jurisdictional issues will be issued 
(mailed to the last known address of the parties or delivered in person) in writing 
with a complete statement of the findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of 
law. Each appeal decision which is sent to the parties will include or be accomp-
anied by a notice specifying the further appeal rights of the parties. The notice 
of appeal rights shall state clearly the place and manner for taking an appeal 
from the decision and the period within which an appeal may be taken. 
0. FINALITY OF DECISION 
Decisions of the Administrative Law Judge are binding on all parties and are the 
final decision of the commission as provided by Section 35-4-10(f) unless appealed 
within ten days of mailing or delivery of the decision. 
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A71-07-l:6 DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY -- RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(II) CONTINUING JURISDICTION 
Section 35-4-6(b) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be con-
tinuous. Upon its own iniative or upon application of any 
party affected, the commission or its authorized represen-
tatives may on the basis of change in conditions or because 
of a mistake as to facts, review a decision allowing or 
disallowing in whole or in part a claim for benefits. Such 
review shall be conducted in accordance with such regula-
tions as the commission may prescribe and result in a new 
decision which may award, terminate, continue, increase, or 
decrease such benefits, or may result in a referral of such 
claim to an appeal tribunal. Notice of any such redeter-
mination shall be promptly given to the party applying for 
redetermination and to other parties entitled to notice of 
the original determination, in the manner prescribed in 
this section with respect to notice of an original determin-
ation. Such new order shall be subject to review and an 
appeal as provided in this section. No review shall be 
made after one year from the date of the original determin-
ation except in cases of fraud, or claimant fault, as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of this section. 
A. GENERAL DEFINITION 
This section of the Act specifies the conditions under which the Department, as 
the agent of the commission, has the authority to reconsider decisions made 
with regard to claims for benefits after they have become final. A decision is 
not final until the time permitted for the filing of an appeal has elapsed. 
There are no limitations on the review of decisions during the appeal period. 
Section 35-4-10(f) states that decisions made by the Department are final and 
conclusive for all purposes affecting the commission, the claimant and all employ-
ing units that had notice of the determination unless it is appealed by one of 
the parties, or jurisdiction is established under one of the provisions of Section 
35-4-6(b). This regulation establishes the guidelines for the Department's 
exercise of discretion in reviewing decisions. 
B. LIMITED JURISDICTION 
The Department has np jurisdiction to review or reconsider final decisions 
with regard to benefits beyond one year from the date of the decision unless 
the claimant was at fault in creation of an overpayment. Jurisdiction may be 
taken for up to one year after the original determination was made provided 
there was either: 1. a change in conditions, or 2. a mistake as to facts. 
When a decision is made on an issue, the date shown by the Department Representa-
tive on the notice provided to the parties or the date the decision is recorded 
in the Department's records is the date of the decision. If a decision was not 
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made, the date the Department was on notice of an issue but failed to act is the 
date of the decision. 
1. Change of Conditions 
A change of conditions may include^ but is not limited to^ _ a change in the law 
which would make a reconsideration necessary in fairness to the parties who were 
adversely affected by a law change* A change in conditions may also include 
personal circumstances of the claimant or employer which would have made it 
reasonable not to file an appeal, provided those circumstances have subsequently 
and unforeseeably changed. 
2. Mistake as to Facts 
A mistake as to facts is limited to material information which was the basis for 
the decision. A mistake as to facts may include information which is misunder-
stood or misinterpreted, but does not include an error in the application of the 
Act or the Rules provided the decision is made under the correct section of the 
Act. A "mistake" is inadvertent rather than wrong information intentionally 
provided by the party subsequently alleging the mistake. 
C. UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 
There is no time limitation on exercising jurisdiction if there was fraud or a 
overpayment as the result of fault by the claimant. There must be an overpayment 
which is charged to the claimant in accordance with provisions of Section 35-4-6(d) 
before jurisdiction can be taken beyond one year after the original determination. 
D. DISCRETION 
The statute does not require the Department to take jurisdiction in all cases 
where there is a change in conditions or a mistake as to facts; the statute 
merely permits the Department to take jurisdiction. The claimant and employer 
may request a, reconsideration of a decision, but they cannot compel the Depart-
ment to exercise continuing jurisdiction. The Department will exercise continuing 
jurisdiction if it is necessary in fairness to an interested party who did not 
have access to material information or could not reasonably have filed an appeal 
provided there was a mistake as to facts or a change in conditions. However, 
jurisdiction may not be taken if the redetermination would have little or no 
effect. The Department will weigh the administrative burden of making a redeter-
mination against the requirements of fairness and the opportunities of the 
parties affected to file an appeal. Jurisdiction will be taken in all cases 
where the Department is aware of a claimant fault overpayment which is large 
enough to be "set up" as provided by the Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-6 (d). 
E. OBLIGATION OF DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES 
Employees of the Department are obligated, regardless of when the information is 
discovered, to bring to the attention of the proper Department representatives 
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any information that may af fect an ind iv idua l ' s e l i g i b i l i t y for unemployment 
insurance benefi ts or information af fect ing the employer's contr ibut ions, 
F. NOTICE 
Any time a decision is reconsidered all interested parties will be notified of 
the new information and provided an opportunity to attend hearings held in 
conjunction with the review. All interested parties will receive notification 
of the redetermination and given the right to appeal. 
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